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Summary
The world economy is quickly gaining 
complexity as a result of globalization, becoming 
an ever-larger, increasingly interconnected, more 
heterogeneous and more dynamic system. The 
risks in this globalized world consequently differ 
from the risks of the past, in terms of their 
potential damage, their temporal dimension, 
their geographical scope, the irreversibility of 
their potential damage, their potential for social 
conflict, and in their mutual interdependency. In 
turn, these new qualities also produce fundamental 
changes in the requirements for sustainable action 
strategies. Many precedent-setting economic 
policy decisions nevertheless remain based on 
principles that fail to fulfill these requirements:
  The growth paradigm increasingly conflicts 
with the reality of globally limited resources, and 
no longer serves to increase overall welfare within 
post-industrial societies. 
  Explanations and predictions offered by 
standard economic models are increasingly 
diverging from reality. 
  In many critical areas, the pursuit of short-
term, local objectives leads neither to long-term 
nor globally advantageous results. 
  Decision-making processes are increasingly 
unprepared to deal with rising levels of complexity 
and uncertainty.
The impetus for the development of alternatives 
comes primarily from interdisciplinary research:
  There are suggestions as to how resource 
cycles can be kept in balance through the practice 
of rematerialization of old or discarded goods; 
happiness research has questioned the benefit of 
economic growth; various initiatives are seeking 
measures of welfare able to replace GDP as 
indices that can guide policy activity. 
  The findings of behavioral, evolutionary and 
complexity researchers are contributing to the 
development of new economic theories. The 
rapidly increasing power of computer simulations 
also helps in this regard. 
The requirements for sustainable action strategies are undergoing fundamental change 
as a result of the rapidly increasing complexity of the global economy. Many of the 
conceptual underpinnings of economic policy-making  must be radically rethought: from 
the paradigm of growth to standard economic models to local and short-term incentive 
systems to existing decision-making architectures. A sustainable global economic 
model should minimize risks, be resilient to crises, and provide future generations the 
opportunity to lead a fulfilled life on our planet. Doing so demands that we facilitate 
creative and well-founded ideas.
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Old risks in new bottles
Many of the risks addressed in the context of 
current debates regarding globalization are not in 
their essence new: the scarcity of resources critical 
to survival, speculative bubbles, extreme social 
inequality, mass migration, pandemics, terrorism 
and even state bankruptcies have long been a part 
of the fabric of human life.
  In his book “Collapse,” Jared Diamond argues 
compellingly that the inhabitants of Easter Island 
handled their scarce timber resources so wastefully 
that the civil war triggered by the issue ultimately 
destroyed their entire culture (Diamond 2005).
  The Netherlands’ notorious tulip mania ended 
in 1637 with the collapse of a speculative bubble. 
Previously, tulip bulb prices had soared as tulips 
became collectors’ items for which exorbitant 
amounts of money exchanged hands. 
  Triggered by the invasion of the Huns in the 
fourth century, mass migrations took place across 
Europe for the next 200 years.
  The Black Death, the great plague pandemic 
that lasted from 1347 to 1353, spread across the 
whole of Europe and led to an estimated 25 
million deaths, about one-third of the population 
at the time.
  The “German Autumn” of 1977 marked the 
climax of a wave of terrorism in Germany. Among 
other events, this involved the murder of Hanns 
Martin Schleyer, president of the Confederation 
of German Employers’ Associations, and the 
hijacking of the Lufthansa airplane “Landshut.” 
Beyond Germany’s RAF, the 1970s saw the 
formation of terrorist groups in other European 
countries, such as the IRA in Ireland, the ETA in 
Spain and the BR in Italy. 
  At the end of 2001, Argentinian President de 
la Rúa declared his country unable to repay its 
debts. Three years previously, the country had 
been plunged into a recession that led to capital 
f light, a banking crisis, excessive government 
indebtedness and inflation.
Some crises have led to radical societal changes, 
while others have plunged whole cultures into 
collapse. It seems as though one would only have 
to look back precisely enough, carefully analyzing 
the past and drawing appropriate conclusions, in 
order to find the correct responses to the risks 
of modernity. However, there is a significant 
difference between the crises of the past and 
today’s threats. Indeed, the context has radically 
changed. At issue are no longer simply regional 
cultures, or catastrophes with primarily local 
  Environmental-economic and polit ical-
economy considerations within supranational 
mechanisms such as certificate trading or 
“commons trusts” aim at the development of 
enforceable strategies for the solution of global 
and long-term challenges that lie outside the 
state-market spectrum. 
  Clever algorithms are utilizing the broad 
availability of data and vast amounts of computing 
power to reduce complexity and provide a reliable 
basis for decision-making. At the same time, 
participatory processes – particularly those that 
are Internet-based – make available an important 
resource for intel l igent decision-making 
architectures.
However, many fundamental questions remain, 
such as whether and how economic growth can 
be decoupled from resource consumption, which 
global redistribution mechanisms we need and 
how these can be implemented, what a better 
global decision-making architecture might look 
like, and how fundamental uncertainty can be 
dealt with in a systematic way.
Even once forward-looking approaches are 
identified, it will be a challenge to translate 
such ideas from academia into the policy-making 
and economic spheres. Moreover, structures that 
enable effective global policy steering must be 
created at the same time. The prime objective 
should be to draw on creative yet well-founded 
ideas to develop a sustainable global business and 
social model that minimizes risks, is resilient in 
the face of crises, and offers future generations 
the opportunity to lead a fulfilled life on our 
planet.
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effects. At stake today is all of humanity, as a look 
back at a century featuring two world wars, a cold 
war and a nuclear arms race illustrates. Today, 
global resource shortages loom, the entire world 
economy is shaken by finance crises, worldwide 
mass migrations due to climate change and 
severe developmental differences can be foreseen, 
and terrorist attacks like that on 11 September 
2001 in New York shift perceptions of security 
worldwide. And it is virtually unimaginable what 
a global pandemic might mean, or what global 
implications the bankruptcy of a major economy 
such as that of the United States, Japan or 
significant European countries might hold. 
Rapid technological developments have enabled 
human activities to have impacts as strong as those 
of natural influences; human-induced climate 
change is only the most prominent example. 
Atmospheric chemist and Nobel Prize winner Paul 
Crutzen goes so far as to speak of a new geological 
era, the “Anthropocene” (Crutzen 2002). Yann 
Arthus-Bertrand’s film “Home” illustrates in 
breathtaking images just how we humans have 
changed the planet in the last 60 years.1 
In the 20 years since the end of the Cold 
War, the globalization process has once again 
accelerated immensely. The global interdependence 
of political, economic and social systems has 
produced unprecedented complexity. The risks 
of a globalized world are substantially different 
from the risks of the past – in terms of potential 
damage, temporal dimension, geographical scope, 
irreversibility, potential for social conflict and 
mutual interdependencies. 
The interplay of global megatrends such 
as economic globalization, demographic 
development, climate change and technological 
progress amplifies the influence of local events 
through reciprocities and feedback effects. 
As a result, conventional problem-solving 
strategies are failing. In part due to the border-
constrained nature of national policymaking, these 
strategies are generally effective at the regional 
level only. They are too often oriented toward 
specific trends, and are informed by models 
whose idealized assumptions are helpful under 
readily comprehensible conditions, but which lose 
legitimacy when confronted with the complexity 
of globally interconnected systems.
1 www.youtube.com/user/homeproject
The global economy as a dynamic 
network
The structural changes in the global economy 
stand out when one sees economic activity as 
part of a dynamic network. The objects within 
this network are the market actors, the economic 
goods, the factors of production, the available 
information, etc.2 The quantity of these objects is 
a measure of the size of the network. The objects 
stand in varying relationships to one another: 
Market actors interact with one another, certain 
factors of production are needed to produce a 
good, market actors have access to certain bits of 
information, and so on. 
These dependencies can be abstractly 
represented by links between the objects. The 
average number of links per object is a measure 
of the interconnectedness of the system as a whole3. 
Both the objects and the links between them 
have very widely varying properties. For example, 
market players have varying preferences, natural 
resources are distributed very unevenly from a 
geographical perspective, access to information 
is sometimes better and sometimes worse, etc. 
Indicators of this variance measure the heterogeneity 
of the network4. Of course, because we are dealing 
with a dynamic network, the objects and the links 
within the network change over time. Indicators 
of the rate of change measure the dynamics of the 
network.
Table 1 outlines how the global economy changes 
in terms of size, complexity, heterogeneity and 
dynamism in the course of global transformation.
The Atlas of Economic Complexity (Hausmann 
et al. 2011) deals with these changes in great 
detail. In summation, the particular challenge lies 
in the fact that all of humanity today lives and 
interacts within a single large, highly networked, 
very heterogeneous and highly dynamic system.
2 We do not aim here to provide an exact definition of 
the network model, but rather the idea of a meta-model 
illustrating structural changes.
3 This is a very simple measure of the degree of 
interconnectedness. Other graph-theoretical indicators 
such as connectivity numbers or expansion properties 
describe other aspects of global networking.
4 For example, consider here indicators such as the 
Atkinson measure, or the Gini or Theil indices, which 
although used primarily for the measurement of income 
and wealth inequalities, are in principle applicable to any 
statistical distribution.
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made in a given situation tends not to do so. 
This is because these decisions depend ultimately 
on actors’ brain structures, which change only 
marginally over time, at least if one assumes that 
the intergenerational evolution of the human 
brain is an extremely slow process.5
On the one hand, this means that the capacity of 
single individuals to deal with complex situations 
requiring decisions has its limits. On the other, 
this insight also offers cause for hope: The better 
the functioning of the brain can be understood, 
and thus the behavior of people under specific 
circumstances, the better that situations that 
demand decisions can be modeled, analyzed and 
simulated. 
5 At the same time, research shows that over the course 
of a full lifetime, the brain has a large, mostly untapped 
development potential that could be better exploited by 
new types of lifelong learning (Staudinger, Marsiske and 
Baltes 1995).
Decision-making in a complex world
The evolution of the global economy is 
determined by:
  the decisions and actions of its actors 
(individuals, groups, institutions); and 
  the repercussions of these decisions and 
actions within the system. 
Decisions themselves are driven by individual 
needs and convictions, social norms, economic 
condit ions, pol it ical environments and 
technological opportunities. These drivers in turn 
are endogenous components of the system, and 
are themselves likewise governed by the global 
dynamic. The focal point for the emergence 
of global risks is ultimately the interplay of 
individual and institutional decisions under a 
given set of conditions. Herein lies a paradox: 
While the environment increases in complexity, 
the manner in which individual decisions are 
Table 1: 
Global economic changes 
in four dimensions
4
¡ More market actors 
¡ Larger market volumes 
¡ More information available 
¡ Stronger quantitative effects associated with
 human activity
¡ Stronger interaction between market actors 
¡ More complex value-added chains 
¡ Higher availability of information 
¡ Larger scope for effects of human activity 
¡ Heterogeneous capabilities and needs of market  
 actors; unequal distribution of resources 
¡ Higher product diversity 
¡ Varying availability of information 
¡ Strong global variability of market effects
¡ Intensifying interaction dynamics 
¡ Faster change in production processes 
¡ Increase in information density 
¡ Faster propagation of effects of human activity;
 delays in global distribution
Size of 
network 
increases
Connectedness
increases
Heterogeneity 
increases
Dynamism 
increases




The “big picture” in which individual decisions 
are made depends substantially on decisions that 
are made institutionally, in the sense that multiple 
people are involved in an institutionalized 
decision-making process. These include fiscal 
policies, business strategies, or supranational 
finance market regulations. In contrast to the 
way individual decisions are made, institutional 
decisions can be deliberately shaped. To be sure, 
individual choices form the basis for institutional 
decisions, as individual persons are ultimately 
involved in the shaping process. However, the 
process of institutional decision-making can make 
available problem-solving capacities that single 
individuals cannot possess. Institutional decisions 
are distinguished by the fact that they are rooted 
in the surrounding environment’s social systems, 
such as organizations or cultures, rather than 
solely in the brain structures of the individuals 
involved. Although these environmental features 
too possess a certain inertia, their underlying 
evolutionary processes are much faster than are 
their biological counterparts. 
Decision-making processes must adapt 
themselves to globalization’s growing complexity. 
The point of leverage here lies in the shaping of 
institutional decision-making processes, in which 
the potential for achievement is greater than the 
sum of the individual participants’ potential, and 
which as sociocultural structures (as opposed 
to physiological brain structure), are malleable. 
The bottom line is that the development of 
the global economy is significantly influenced 
by decisions made at the level of governments, 
central banks, international organizations and 
multinational corporations. These decisions also 
form the framework that encompasses most 
global risks.6 However, many of the fundamental 
principles on which these institutional decisions 
depend are increasingly less appropriate within 
the complexity and dynamic shifts of the global 
economy. In what follows, we focus on four such 
challenges.
The growth paradigm increasingly conflicts with 
the reality of globally limited resources, and no 
longer promotes well-being within post-industrial 
societies. Worldwide consumer demand, and thus 
6 This does not apply to risks of natural origin such as 
pandemics or natural disasters. Nevertheless, institutional 
decisions can in these areas too have an influence on the 
quality of preparedness and safeguards.
resource requirements too, will climb rapidly 
in the years ahead. However, economic policy 
decisions relying wholly on economic growth 
are not indefinitely sustainable. On the one hand 
(at least under methods existing today), there is 
a limit to the amount that can be produced; on 
the other, the limited number of consumers and 
scarce time resources means that consumption 
cannot take place ad infinitum.7 But even as the 
possibility of unlimited growth is being called 
into question, so too is the concept’s basic sense. 
At a certain stage of growth, the contribution of 
economic growth to the increase in people’s levels 
of satisfaction seems to drop sharply. 
Explanations and predictions offered by 
economic models are increasingly diverging from 
reality. Global amplification and feedback effects 
are enabling the development of phenomena 
such as the current financial crisis, which most 
economists failed to predict, and which even in 
retrospect has eluded convincing explanation 
within the framework of established economic 
theories. This is because central elements 
of traditional economics, such as the Homo 
economicus model, the eff icient-market 
hypothesis, closed equilibrium systems or 
assumptions of homogeneity, do not account 
for aspects such as cognitive biases, information 
asymmetries, phase transitions with multiple 
unstable equilibria or heterogeneity. There is a 
risk that economic policy strategies will be based 
on theoretical assumptions that effectively blind 
policymakers to important aspects of reality. The 
global economy becomes more susceptible to risks 
as a result, and consequently more fragile. 
In many critical areas, the pursuit of short-term, 
local objectives leads neither to long-term nor 
globally advantageous results. In large systems, 
which to a large extent consist of unrelated 
individual components, global target values can 
be optimized by optimizing the corresponding 
values at the individual component level. With 
increasing complexity, however, this is less and 
less true: The welfare of people in one location 
depends ever more on the actions of other people 
at a distant location. Feedback effects associated 
7 However, the time horizons of an initially steady rise 
in consumer demand and any potential global consumer 
saturation differ substantially. This means that at least 
globally, a saturation point is unlikely to occur within the 
next few decades.
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with global interdependence lead to a divergence 
between short- and long-term goals, as well as 
between local and global targets. 
Decision-making processes are increasingly 
inadequate to deal with rising levels of 
complexity and uncertainty. Increasingly 
complex systems become increasingly difficult 
to control, and develop what can sometimes be 
dangerous internal dynamics. The worldwide 
interdependence of political, economic and social 
systems, technological change, and the interaction 
of diverse global forces in the Anthropocene 
era create explosively climbing complexity, with 
which human capabilities are increasingly less able 
to cope. Furthermore, as the complexity of the 
systems in which we interact increases, structural 
uncertainties also deepen, and we are often forced 
to make decisions despite having only incomplete 
information available. 
In order to avoid sliding with ever greater 
frequency from one global crisis to the next, it 
appears essential to reconsider the bases for our 
decisions in a radical manner and address the 
corresponding challenges:
  Solving the growth dilemma
  Developing appropriate economic models
  Developing new strategies and mechanisms 
for long-term and globally oriented action
  Developing new decision-making processes 
able to deal with complex challenges
In the next section, a number of future-oriented 
approaches show how these challenges can be met.
Future-oriented approaches
Solving the growth dilemma
The first question is whether growth per se 
serves human purposes at all, and whether the 
economy could somehow function even without 
growth. This question goes to the heart of 
so-called post-growth economics ( Jackson 
2009, Paech 2005). The starting point is the 
recognition that peoples’ well-being – at least in 
the industrialized nations – has already become 
decoupled from economic growth (Frey 2008, 
Oswald 1997). At the same time, happiness 
research has reported that economic contractions, 
particularly heterogeneous cases that affect some 
people more strongly than others, strongly reduce 
people’s sense of well-being. It remains unclear 
how a transition towards an economy without 
growth might manifest itself. 
But even if continuous growth should prove 
essential for the economy, two fundamental 
constraints remain. On the production side, 
natural resources are globally limited, as the Club 
of Rome noted in its 1972 report “The Limits to 
Growth” and its subsequent updates (see Meadows 
et al. 1972, Meadows et al. 2004). And on the 
expenditure side, consumption capacity is similarly 
constrained by the number of consumers and 
the time available for consumption; these limits 
ultimately could lead to saturation and stagnation.
Of course, these limitations are only for specific 
types of growth based on the consumption of 
resources, and in which additional time is spent 
in the process of consumption. Thus, several 
ways out lie close to hand: On the one hand, 
fewer resources could be depleted (through 
more efficient production or targeted reuse of 
materials), alternative resources used (such as 
renewable energy or nuclear fusion) and growth 
oriented increasingly toward goods and services 
that require no non-renewable resources. On 
the other hand, efforts could be made to create 
growth not through more goods and services, but 
through better ones. Specifically targeted support 
of research and innovation seems to provide a 
persistent foundation for promising alternatives.
German process engineer Michael Braungart is 
of the opinion that the often-requested waiver 
is the wrong way to deal with production-side 
limits.8 Instead, he has proposed the “cradle-
to-cradle” principle, which keeps the cycle 
of resources in balance through the reuse of 
materials (McDonough and Braungart 2002). The 
essential idea is to reuse raw materials after their 
processing and disposal, something that would 
require rethinking the design of processing and 
utilization processes. 
8 www.braungart.com/
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With the rise of the emerging markets in the 
coming years, global consumer demand will rise 
rapidly, ensuring that a point of global saturation 
will certainly not be reached for some time. 
Economic stagnation thus remains initially a 
problem primarily for the developed countries. 
Prominent approaches aimed at replacing gross 
national product as an indicator used to guide 
activity include the OECD’s Better Life Index and 
the work of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission 
(Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2009), which has been 
used by the French government.9
New economic models
In 1936, John Maynard Keynes wrote: “The 
extraordinary achievement of the classical theory 
was to overcome the beliefs of the ‘natural man’ 
and, at the same time, to be wrong” (Keynes 
1936). Now, it is the nature of models to employ 
abstractions, in order to reduce complexity while 
simultaneously deriving useful explanations and 
predictions. However, global change increases 
the relevance of influential variables that are not 
included or are given too little weight within 
traditional economic models. The search for 
better models has shown that the inclusion of 
ideas from other disciplines such as psychology, 
physics or biology can be profitable, often at a 
metaphorical level. For example, econophysics 
aims at applying the concept of phase transitions 
to dynamic economic systems; from biology, the 
idea of evolution has entered economic discourse. 
In their book “Animal Spirits: How Human 
Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why it 
Matters for Global Capitalism” (Akerlof and 
Shiller 2009), George Akerlof and Robert Shiller 
adopt Keynes’ idea that human activity is driven 
largely by “animal spirits” rather than by rational 
considerations, as is assumed within (neo)
classical economic theory. Akerlof and Shiller 
cite five aspects of the “animal spirits” intrinsic 
to us: confidence and its multipliers, fairness, 
corruption and antisocial behavior, the money 
illusion, and stories that shape our understanding 
of the world. The authors – along with many other 
prominent economists – see the fact that standard 
economic theories wholly ignore these aspects of 
human nature as a core reason for the emergence 
9 www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org
of speculative bubbles (and hence also for the 
current financial crisis). 
In addition, former IBM Chief Technologist 
Gunter Dueck explains how basic human 
tendencies lead to overreaction and thus 
exacerbate alternating boom and bust phases; he 
argues that underlying emotional reactions should 
thus be taken quite seriously (Dueck 2006). And 
Herbert Gintis, an economist at the University 
of Massachusetts, the Santa Fe Institute and the 
Central European University in Budapest notes 
that the assumptions of the various scholarly 
disciplines that study human behavior in fact 
diverge strongly. He has called for a unification 
of these intellectual fundaments within the 
fields of economics, sociology, anthropology and 
psychology (Gintis 2009).
In his book “Rethinking Macroeconomics: What 
Failed and How to Repair It,” Nobel prize-
winning economist Joseph Stiglitz deals repeatedly 
with the effects of failing to assume heterogeneity 
within the standard economic model, and notes in 
particular that the heterogeneity of expectations 
among market participants is a key contributor to 
systemic imbalance (Stiglitz 2011). 
The abundance of data available today (something 
that will increase even further in the future), 
along with the growing power of computers, for 
the first time offers the possibility to verify the 
validity of models on an empirical basis, and to 
use complex simulations to derive macroeconomic 
models from microeconomic principles – an idea 
that derives from the newly created area of agent-
based computational economics (Tesfatsion and 
Judd 2006). 
Table 2, taken from “The Origin of Wealth,” 
(Beinhocker 2006) summarizes the main 
differences between “traditional economics” and 
a new theory of “complexity economics.” 
Having at hand all these new models and 
approaches, it is, however, critical to remember that 
rising levels of complexity will always ensure that 
some uncertainties remain. It appears important, 
therefore, to explore meta-level issues more deeply, 
such as where the ability to model reaches its 
limits, and what useful conclusions can be drawn 
for dealing with the consequent uncertainty.
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economic theory, the market’s “invisible hand” 
enables actors’ self-interested pursuit of profit 
to lead to the optimum macroeconomic state. 
However, individual decisions do have an effect 
on uninvolved market participants, through what 
are called externalities. These are external costs 
or external benefits which the market price does 
not – or at least does not sufficiently – take into 
account. Internalization is possible through the 
use of regulatory instruments such as the trading 
of certificates (for example, emissions or debt 
allowances) or the taxation of activities that cause 
externalities. In order for these instruments to 
be effective with regard to global externalities, 
they must be enforced at the global level, which 
is a major challenge due to the lack of global 
New strategies for long-term and globally 
oriented action
The world economy is becoming increasingly 
irreducible, insofar as global problems are less 
amenable to solution through being broken into 
their local components and solved on an individual 
basis. Examples include collective CO2 emissions 
that exacerbate global climate change, or trade 
wars that arise because individual states put their 
selfish short-term interests ahead of long-term 
global solutions. In such a rapidly changing world, 
however, the danger arises that the fastest possible 
answers to daily events will be given ever-greater 
priority, while long-term consequences will drop 
from view. 
Individual preferences provide a starting 
point in addressing this dilemma. In classical 
8
Table 2:
Traditional economics 
and complexity 
economics compared 
(Beinhocker 2006, 
Table 4-1)
¡ Closed, static, linear systems
 in equilibrium
¡ Collectively modeled
¡ Make decisions using complex
 deductive calculations 
¡ Comprehensively informed 
¡ Failure- and bias-free
¡ No learning or adaptation
 requirements
¡ Modeled on the basis of   
 actors’ indirect interactions  
 through market mechanisms
¡ Micro- and macroeconomics
 remain separate
¡ No mechanism for renewal of
 the system or increase in  
 order and complexity
Dynamics
Actors
Structure
of ties
Emergence
Evolution
¡ Open, dynamic, non-linear
 systems not in equilibrium
¡ Individually modeled 
¡ Make decisions using inductive
 rules of thumb 
¡ Incompletely informed 
¡ Prone to bias 
¡ Capable of learning and
 adaptation
¡ Modeled on the basis of direct
 interactions between individual
 actors
¡ Micro- and macroeconomics
 are linked 
¡ Macro-level models are
 emergent results of
 interactions at micro level
¡ Evolution process based on
 selection, mutation and
 amplification provides for
 renewal of the system and the
 increase in order and
 complexity
Traditional economics Complexity economics
governance structures. In addition, it is often 
difficult or virtually impossible to quantify 
externalities in monetary terms. In the case of 
long-term externalities, this is made particularly 
difficult by complexities, uncertainties and 
inconsistent time preferences. 
In addition, there are alternatives to market 
mechanisms that produce fewer externalities 
and are more efficient, wasting fewer resources. 
Nobel prizewinner Elinor Ostrom, an expert on 
environmental economics, has shown that so-
called commons problems, in which there is a 
danger of depletion of freely available resources, 
are in certain contexts better solved by cooperative 
self-organization than by the market and state 
action (Ostrom 1990). Economist Peter Barnes 
has suggested the establishment of so-called 
commons trusts in order to facilitate a more 
equitable and sustainable usage of common goods 
(Barnes 2006).
New decision-making processes for dealing 
with complex challenges
One of the central insights of cybernetics is 
the “law of requisite variety,” also known as 
“Ashby’s law” (Ashby 1956). This states that as 
more possibilities for action are available to a 
system’s control mechanism, the better able it 
is to compensate for increases in the number 
of potential failure points (and thus for greater 
complexity). In short: Handling complex systems 
can only be performed successfully through the 
use of processes that are themselves complex. It 
is thus advisable to approach complex challenges 
with strategies that are sufficiently complex. 
The most complex problem-solving tool 
available to us is the human brain. Particularly 
in the subconscious elements of the brain, many 
experiences are processed in such a way as to 
form the basis of evaluations, which in turn 
enable very complex problems encountered later 
to be decided quickly. For this reason, in periods 
of stable conditions, intuition and gut feelings 
often function surprisingly well. Problems arise, 
however, if conditions change abruptly. In periods 
of change, reliance on the intuition of individual 
decision makers is a risky proposition. As social 
scientist and Nobel economics prizewinner 
Herbert Simon writes in “Models of Bounded 
Rationality”: “The capacity of the human mind 
for formulating and solving complex problems is 
very small compared with the size of the problems 
whose solution is required for objectively rational 
behavior in the real world – or even for a 
reasonable approximation to such objective 
rationality” (Simon 1982). This argument is given 
weight by the insight drawn from brain research 
that “objectively rational behavior” is in any case 
an illusion produced by the cortex – the brain 
region responsible for rational decisions – “after 
limbic structures and functions have already 
determined what is to be done,” as biologist and 
neuroscientist Gerhard Roth says (Roth 2003). 
Conventional theories and processes too 
founder when confronted with the increasing 
complexity associated with globalization, and 
with the increases in the speed of development 
and information exchange associated with 
technological progress. As a result, even experts 
are often left perplexed, while decision makers 
find themselves overwhelmed and bereft of clear 
direction.
If the growing complexity has overwhelmed 
existing decision-making mechanisms, two 
possibilities exist: either to reduce the complexity 
with the help of other instruments, or devise 
new mechanisms that are better adapted to the 
complexity. Vast computing power can today 
be applied to the task of reducing complexity. 
Moreover, a huge amount of data is available 
for analysis and knowledge extraction, while 
highly complex simulations enable the discovery 
of fundamental patterns and the creation of 
comprehensive forecasts. Current examples 
include the IBM Smarter Planet Initiative10 or 
the FuturICT project which, though still in the 
planning phase, aims at large-scale simulations of 
social systems.11
Another form of complexity reduction is 
the visual representation of data, which has 
become the task of the relatively new field of 
data-driven journalism. Through the open and 
vivid presentation of data and facts, one of the 
basic conditions for dealing with complexity – 
transparency of dependencies – is fulfilled. Such 
10 www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/de/de/
11 www.futurict.eu/
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efforts are currently being promoted by the open 
data movement. 
However, the automated reduction of 
complexities also has limits, as ascertaining the 
character of complex interdependencies is often 
impossible, a hurdle that in turn hinders the 
production of valid predictions. In such cases, 
a fundamentally different approach to dealing 
with future challenges must be found. This 
includes both the assessment of future risks, a task 
that no longer appears possible using statistical 
methods and rational expectations theory, and 
the preparation for several possible futures whose 
probabilities are not quantifiable.
Scenario planning techniques and other methods 
of futures research could gain in importance as 
providing the foundations for decisions. Dealing 
with fundamental uncertainty as opposed to 
calculable risks is an increasingly urgent challenge, 
and one which has not yet been explored deeply 
enough from a structural perspective. 
With respect to new mechanisms, intelligent 
decision-making architectures are required. 
Networking is a key factor within this area. The 
Internet offers a valuable opportunity to share 
knowledge around the world, engage many people 
in conversation and draw on collective intelligence 
(Surowiecki 2004). The potential inherent in 
information and communications technologies 
extends well beyond majority decisions, average 
ratings and the endless comment threads in 
online forums; the intelligent analysis of social 
networks, elaborated discussion and evaluation 
platforms, and the automatic semantic processing 
of large-scale texts are on the way. 
In their book “Nudge: Improving Decisions 
about Health, Wealth and Happiness,” economists 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein write about 
decision architectures, and propose their concept 
of “libertarian paternalism” as a guiding principle 
in designing processes (Thaler and Sunstein 
2009). The idea is to guarantee actors the largest 
possible freedom of choice, while at the same time 
“nudging” them toward deciding in a (societally) 
desirable manner.
Global rethinking required
The above-noted challenges to the foundations 
of global decision-making give rise to a whole 
series of fundamental questions:
  To what extent does a market economic system 
– particularly in a highly complex society with a 
global division of labor – need economic growth 
in order to function?
  How might economic incentives for sustainable 
growth look? How might growth and resource use 
be decoupled?
  What are the “correct” microeconomic foundations 
on which to construct macroeconomic models?
  How can systems be made resilient? How can 
they be both robust and adaptable?
  Are local redistribution mechanisms enough, 
or do we need globally managed redistribution? 
What normative principles should be used to 
decide which distribution of resources is globally 
just? How might processes that produce these 
principles look? Are there realistic alternatives 
to compensatory redistribution, perhaps in the 
form of business models that automatically 
respond better to heterogeneous environments 
and produce “fairer” output distributions ? 
  What significance might be held by new 
mechanisms that fall outside the spectrum 
traditionally bounded by the market and planned 
economies? How can these be brought to scale? 
  Which problems can be solved by 
“relocalization,” and which cannot? Where is 
global governance necessary, and how can it be 
effectively designed? 
  How can externalities at the global level be 
internalized (on a politically practical basis)? What 
mechanisms already in place enable the pursuit 
of global and long-term goals? How can limited 
resources in particular be priced in conformity 
with market principles, and how can inconsistent 
time preferences be factored in? 
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  What would it look like to create networked 
knowledge and decision-making systems that 
enable a new level of quality in dealing with 
complex systems, thanks to the intelligent 
combination of individual human capacities and 
available information? What role can the Internet 
play in this process? 
  How can today’s data processing capacities and 
advanced algorithms help to create complex solutions 
that match the growing complexities of problems? 
  What new approaches to risk assessment 
and futures planning are emerging? How can 
fundamental uncertainty be dealt with in a 
systematic way?
Scientific engagement with the challenges 
described above is still in its infancy, and remains 
far from being regarded as “mainstream.” Some 
latent awareness that the classic foundations 
for decision-making must be fundamentally 
overhauled does exist today within scholarly, 
political and civil-society circles, but remains 
very shallow and weak. The lack of ideas on how 
to proceed and the focus on more immediately 
pressing phenomena make a fundamental 
examination of these issues difficult. While the 
identification of future-oriented approaches itself 
is no easy task, the next challenge will be to 
translate such ideas from academia into policy 
and economic practice. This is particularly true in 
those areas where global management is required, 
but no corresponding global structures suitable to 
the task are in place. 
In addition, it is important to find new ways of 
dealing with risks, since – as described above – 
these are qualitatively changing. Linear, individual 
case studies are of increasingly less help. The 
rational assumption that a risk can be sufficiently 
precisely characterized through its probability 
of occurrence and potential for damage no 
longer holds in a networked, heterogeneous 
world; this is because the significance of other 
risk dimensions – the distribution of potential 
damage, irreversibility, and so on – has risen, 
and because the high level of complexity and 
uncertainty often renders probability and potential 
damage unquantifiable. The future will likely 
be characterized by increasingly unpredictable 
discontinuities, and we must find ways to deal 
with it by making our economic and social order 
accordingly resistant.
Already today, behavioral and evolutionary 
economics, statistical physics, the emerging 
interdisciplinary science of complex systems, and 
new agent-based models are contributing to a 
better understanding of the global economic 
order. The crucial question for the years ahead 
will be whether and how researchers’ ideas will 
show up in the shaping of finance and economic 
policy, and whether this will succeed in developing 
a sustainable global economic and social model 
able to minimize risks, resist crises and give future 
generations the opportunity to lead a fulfilled 
life on our planet. As Arthus-Bertrand says so 
strikingly in closing his documentary “Home”: 
“It’s too late to be a pessimist.”
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